Overview and Introduction to the Data
The global distribution of income has been the subject of considerable academic and popular commentary in the recent past, because of concerns with poverty, inequality and inclusivity, which are distinct but interdependent. All of these concerns can be illuminated by data on who had what income and consumption, notwithstanding the need to look beyond this in order to adequately characterize living standards in their nonincome dimensions as well as to recognize other aspects of social inequity and inequality (involving command over wealth, power and status).
Interest in these themes is partly the result of the world becoming more globally integrated. Anxieties and concerns about the distributional effects of cross-border flows of trade and finance have grown. Along with the substantial increase in the movement of capital and goods across borders there has also been a great increase in the ease and quantity of communication. The greater perceived and actual connection between individuals has created a global 'imagined community' in which well-being of distant others, and disparities between members of world society, are perceived by many to matter. The success or failure of the project of world development over the last seventy years, and over the contemporary period of international economic integration in particular, are also of pressing evaluative and practical interest. Unsurprisingly, evaluations of the trend of global poverty have played a large role in discussions of the impact of globalization as well as of national policy choices over the last twenty-five years. Inequality, both at the national and global level, is a topic that has become increasingly politically salient in national debate (appearing as a central consideration in US President Obama's State of the Union Address in 2015) or in international policy dialogues (e.g. as an key theme in discussions toward the Post 2015 Millennium Development Goals agenda). The role of inequality as cause and consequence of the global financial crisis of 2008 and afterwards has been one recent aspect of that concern.
Similarly, the demand for inclusive growth and development in India or for a harmonious society in China in the last fifteen years have reflected a concern not merely to moderate relative inequalities but to ensure that gains are realized by all, in the presence of sometimes unprecedentedly high and unevenly distributed rates of growth.
The last three decades have also experienced a data revolution. More and better surveys have been collected by multiple agencies, including the World Bank (e.g. through the Living Standards Measurement Surveys) the LIS (formerly known as the Luxembourg Income Study) and others, with some effort being made to achieve greater international comparability. These are now available in readily portable format that is analyzable in unprecedented ways on desktop computers. Extensive efforts to collect price data by the International Comparison Program (ICP) have also provided greater ability account for differences in purchasing power across countries (if not over time). The ICP collects comparative price and expenditure data from countries to estimate purchasing power parities (PPPs) of countries periodically. PPPs are meant, inter alia, to facilitate crosscountry comparisons of material well-being through better assessment of differences in price levels and resulting command over real resources. As a result of these developments, researchers have come to be able to produce estimates of global inequality based on collections of household surveys --as opposed to on estimates of GDP per capita 5 --in the last twenty years. They continue to update their efforts (see e.g. Milanovic, 2012 , Lakner and Milanovic 2013 and Anand and Segal 2010 for useful examples of such work) so as to provide a more comprehensive portrait of the pattern of material living standards of the world's population. Nevertheless, there are serious limitations of comparability, coverage and transparency of such data. Each effort also has a 'one-off' character, whereas an ongoing monitoring system for collation and analysis of data would have evident uses.
The Global Consumption and Income Project (for a detailed description see Lahoti, Jayadev, Reddy 2014) aims to address these needs by generating more comprehensive and internally consistent data than has been available thus far, constructed according to a transparent methodology, which may be applied to diverse purposes. Our goals are 5 Early estimates of global differences in income based on per-capita income data go back at least to Nurkse (1953) who draws on early data from the United Nations.
however not merely descriptive but also analytical. In this paper, we undertake three separate but interlinked tasks using this dataset and the methods and tools we have developed along with it. First, we provide a portrait of the global distributions of income [in what follows we will often refer to income as shorthand for 'income and
consumption'] and its constituent regional distributions and describe their evolution over time. Second, we describe changes in poverty across the world and in different regions at different poverty lines. Third, we describe the degree to which incomes of individuals have increased at various points in the distribution. In all three cases we aim to understand the respective contributions of movements of specific countries within the world distribution and of changes within countries. While taking cognizance of broader concerns for non-income advantages and for wealth, power and status, for the moment we limit our own investigations to a narrow terrain.
We use data constructed from the Global Consumption and Income Project (GCIP) for our analysis. A fuller description of the methods we mention below is presented in Lahoti, Jayadev and Reddy 2014. The GCIP can be used to generate estimates of the consumption and income means for an arbitrary number of quantiles, which we call a profile, for each country, any user-defined set of country aggregates (such as regions, income groups, or countries which share specific traits such as rapid growth) and for the world as a whole. We construct estimates of annual data from 1960 to 2012, for each percentile of the population. The GCIP is a complete 'time-space system' which produces estimates for every country-year, which is essential in order for us to be able to use it in a flexible way to construct estimates for country aggregates. We restrict ourselves to surveys that provide household per-capita data, as data employing equivalence scales in their construction use widely variable and incomparable methods and constitute a smaller proportion of the available data. For country-years with no consumption and income survey we interpolate or extrapolate the consumption or income profile using survey data from the closest survey years and appropriate growth rates from the national accounts.
The GCIP uses a regression-based 'standardization' method to predict the consumption shares of each quintile of the population for the Global Consumption Database (GCD) in country-years, which have an income survey but no consumption survey and the obverse for the Global Income Database (GID). These quintile estimates are then used to estimate the entire Lorenz curve. The present benchmark version of the database uses 2005 Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) conversion factors to convert mean levels expressed in national currency units to common international currency units but other exchange rates may be used (and indeed the implications of doing so are very initially explored in this paper). National consumer price indices are used to undertake temporal translation into the base year for spatial comparisons. We use estimates of consumption or income levels from surveys wherever they are available. This is a consequential choice, since survey means are often discrepant from (and typically lower than national accounts means). Figure 1 shows the relation between GDP per capita and survey means for country-years in our dataset. It can be seen that generally survey-means are much lower than GDP per-capita but where they are not they are higher. Investigation of the data suggests that this is a phenomenon that crosses decades and world regions. For this reason among others, the estimates of the absolute level of income that we arrive at, as well as its distribution, must be viewed with the proverbial salt in hand.
The GCIP provides data on evolution of world consumption and income annually, by country and by quantile, and has broader temporal and geographical coverage than other comparable datasets. It is unique in providing separate estimates of consumption and income, which tend to be pooled in most datasets. The distributions using the two concepts might be markedly different, possibly leading to incorrect international and intra-nation comparisons across time. The GCIP also provides software tools for filling in missing data, enhancing data reliability by detecting extreme outliers, and generating consumption or income profiles for any aggregation of countries. These tools allow us to analyze evolution of material living standards for any chosen year by geographical regions or income groupings or other grouping of countries. The GCIP provides estimates of Lorenz curves for each year and calculates a 'synthetic population' that allows the analyst subsequently to calculate any poverty, inequality or inclusive growth measure.
We attempt to document fully the assumptions and choices made in the database generation process. The database is constructed in a manner that is intended to make it possible to adopt alternate assumptions and thus to test the sensitivity of the choices made, of which we demonstrate some examples in this paper.
As seen in Table 1 
Inequality
We begin by presenting an initial portrait of the distribution of global consumption and income over the last three decades using the GCID.
First, our database is able to reproduce the general finding (see Milanovic, 2012) and 1970s. Whether one uses data before 1980 or not however, the figures show the gradual disappearance of the 'twin-peaks' phenomenon of slight bi-modality in the global distribution studied by, among others Quah, 1996 , Milanovic, 2005 , Weisbrod et al, 2007 . The concern about the coming of a bi-polar (as opposed to merely unequal!) world has been dispatched by the rapid transition of a large number of individuals who were previously poor and their integration into a global 'middle class' (although the middle class is a complex notion which can be interpreted in many ways and thus should be employed with care). It is crucial to note that in these figures and similar ones that follow the scale is a logarithmic one in which given visual distances on the scale correspond to larger and larger differences in absolute income as one examines comparisons involving higher incomes. As a result, a global distribution that is very skewed to the left appears more even than it is and falsely symmetrical. The actual inequality in the world distribution is consequentially very substantially visually understated. In this sense, the distribution remains bipolar (with a small number of globally 'very rich' facing a very large number of poor and 'lower-middle-class') even as it has become uni-modal. Table   2 provides some summary statistics on the distribution of income and consumption across the benchmark years. PPP per month in 1990 but by 2010, the peak density of the distribution had come to be around $100 PPP per month. As is also clear, despite India's substantial GDP-per-capita growth in the period, compared to 1990, South Asia has fallen behind East Asia and the Pacific. The peak density of the distributions was roughly the same in 1990, but by 2010 the peak density in South Asia is at roughly half the level of East Asia. Another notable feature of the data is a degree of convergence within Europe and Central Asia leading to a less skewed and more even distribution, perhaps due to increases in income in formerly planned economies.
As a result of the fast growth of the Chinese (and to a lesser extent Indian) economy, the world distribution of income and consumption is more equal in 2010 than it was in 1990. While the world distribution of income has grown more equal, the experience of withincountry inequality has been more disparate. there is no general trend, except in so far as initially high inequality countries have falling inequality and low-inequality countries show rising inequality during this period. It is interesting to note that many historically low-inequality western European countries show sharp increases in inequality.
One interesting point to note about the scatterplot on inequality convergence is the preponderance of Sub-Saharan African countries among those with high inequality both at the beginning and at the end of the period (higher than most Latin American countries, contrary to a prominent received 'fact' in economics). This is a result of the fact that we have standardized the concept of advantage so as to make estimates of inequality more comparable; while surveys in Sub-Saharan Africa typically are of consumption, those in Latin America are typically of income, which without adjustment leads to greater estimated inequality in the latter. The high-inequality of Sub-Saharan African countries (and the finding that it is among the highest in the world, and in particular higher than in Latin America) holds in our database for earlier decades as well.
Figure 8 provides a depiction of inequality within countries as measured by the income share of the top decile. We should note here that in every country this is a likely underestimate due to the well-known problem of under-sampling of the very rich. This noted, a number of Sub-Saharan African nations dominate the map. Figure 9 shows the total world inequality attributable to between and within country inequality (using an additively decomposable income inequality measure). Again, as a result of the growth of China and India, the importance of between-country inequality has fallen sharply in explaining global inequality. Within-country inequality now accounts for 43% of global inequality as opposed to 22% contribution it made in 1980. In fact, the between-country component of inequality is at its lowest ever in our sample. Some of this convergence is driven by the fast growth of India, China and other countries but it also has to do with the steady, even if relatively slower, growth of other developing countries (such as Brazil). The contribution of China in this regard is crucial. Without China, the between-country component of global interpersonal inequality would have fallen marginally from 69 percent in 1990 to 66 percent in 2010 (as compared to falling more markedly from 70 percent to 57 percent with China).
Given the facts of global income inequality convergence and the fall in between country inequality over the last 50 years, it is perhaps not surprising to see, as we do in Figure 11 that global relative income inequality is at its lowest measured, whichever inequality measure we use. Even when one examines global absolute inequality (relative inequality as measured by any inequality measure such as the Gini or Theil times the mean), which gives consideration to absolute differences, the remarkable equalizing impact of Chinese and (to a much lesser extent) Indian growth in the recent past is visible. Figure 10 shows the trend in absolute inequality over the last 40 years. Unsurprisingly, given that it is what is known in the literature as a "leftist" measure that registers increasing inequality as long as the absolute income increase going to a poorer person is lower than that going to a richer person, over most of the period it shows rising inequality. Of course, there are many complex and diverse experiences across regions in regard to growth and distribution in this period. In order to capture these variations, we undertake a regional decomposition of inequality trends ( Figure 11 ). We use the World Bank's regional categories and assess the trends in income Gini coefficients for the resulting regions considered as a whole. A few striking conclusions emerge. First, the East Asia and Pacific has been one of the highest inequality regions in the world throughout the period (contrasting with the widely held 'stylized fact' that individual East Asian countries have had fairly low inequality as compared to other regions historically). This is because it contains populations at very different levels of development, from very poor Chinese or Indonesians for example, to Japanese (and more recently Koreans or Singaporeans) who enjoy levels of income of rich countries. However, even within this disparate group, China's rapid income growth has meant that inequality has fallen since 1980 because of the impact of that income-growth on inter-country differences within the region. Meanwhile, at the other end of the spectrum, North America is much more homogenous as a region and overall inequality is correspondingly lower. However, rising inequality within the US in particular has meant that inequality has risen sharply since affected by inter-country differences in growth) and changes within countries. The two need not move together. A similar same pattern of regional inequality change is also witnessed when we look at other measures of relative inequality such as the mean log deviation (GE(0)), the Theil index (GE(1)), the mean-to-median ratio or the Palma ratio (Table 3b ). Between 1990 and 2010, Latin America and the Caribbean, East Asia and Pacific, and Sub-Saharan Africa experienced sharp declines in all these measures, while South Asia and North America saw increases in these measures. A major contribution of the GCIP is to facilitate undertaking regional assessments of the kind undertaken here, which require lining up observations in time and integrating mean and distributional information.
Poverty
We turn now to describing the evolution of global poverty. We use three different In Figure 12 we decompose the poverty trends at the $1.25 PPP threshold for the different WB regions. East Asia and the Pacific shows the most dramatic decline in poverty, being the region with the initially highest headcount ratio as well as the one that has seen the sharpest declines. South Asia also saw apparent decreases, but these were smaller and came later. Sub-Saharan Africa has seen very small decreases in poverty by contrast.
Finally, Latin America has also seen decreases in poverty at this level although largely in early decades, as a result of which 2010 poverty headcount ratios at the $1.25 threshold become very small (approaching North American levels). Taken together these trends give rise to a marked reduction in world poverty after 1980 and the slight rise in poverty in the Eastern European countries after 1990 has little discernible impact globally.
It is instructive, however to look at the headcount ratio at the $4.16 threshold over this period ( Figure 13 ). What is noteworthy here is the fact that over 80% of the populations in Sub-Saharan Africa and in South Asia remain poor by this metric. Only in East Asia and in Latin America has there been substantial progress in moving people above this line, by about 20 percentage points in both cases since 1990. Moreover, in both cases, most of the movement occurred after 2000, a fact that is reflected in Table 4 mentioned above. As a general matter, adopting higher poverty lines leads to lower rates of global poverty reduction with similar regional patterns. Finally, Figure 14 gives a visual indication of the regions with the highest concentrations of poverty at the $2.50 PPP poverty line. Since the databases we employ have been designed to facilitate make alternate assumptions, we intend to explore the implications of using different PPP concepts and other such variations in future estimates of poverty.
Aggregative 'Social Welfare'
Given the uneven nature of growth as well as the changes in inequality, how might we go about assessing whether the world taken as a whole has experienced economic welfare gains during the period in consideration and if so to what extent? A powerful tool in this regard is the adoption of the Generalized Lorenz Curve (GLC) which allows us effectively to rank distributions in terms of welfare. Shorrocks (1983) showed that for any welfare function that is Schur Concave (i.e responds negatively to regressive PigouDalton Transfers and is therefore inequality averse) and that is positively responsive to income, a given distribution of income would provide more welfare than another distribution if its GLC were everywhere higher. Moreover, all such welfare functions would agree on the welfare ranking of two situations if and only if such 'dominance' is established. Figure 15 While the GLC provides a framework for welfare comparisons, using a growth incidence curve provides a more detailed depiction of the beneficiaries of growth across this period.
Growth has been broadly 'inclusive' in the limited sense that it has taken place across percentiles of the world distribution, but it has been rather uneven across the different percentiles, and the temporal pattern of increases has also varied across percentiles, as We have assessed the realism of this quantity for the Indian setting, in which it is a modest standard indeed. In 2015 rupees it comprises an amount between 30,000 and 90,000 rupees per month for a family of four which may be a plausible amount to meet essential everyday requirements and to purchase a very modest quantity of discretionary goods and services in addition. A family in India just above the lower threshold could, we believe, afford a small quantity of branded clothing, a two-wheeled vehicle, two smart phones, private schooling at a very modest standard, and minimal expenses on recreation and entertainment. The assumed cost of the durable goods has been amortized over time.
This exercise is based on our evaluative judgment and could certainly be undertaken otherwise. have seen an increase in the proportion of the population that is in the middle class as we have defined it or above it (which we could provisionally refer to as belonging to the 'upper class'). Chile has witnessed an increase in the proportion of the population belong to the upper class from two percent in 1990 to ten percent in 2010, while in China the proportion of the population belonging to the global middle class rose to nineteen percent in 2010 from no one belonging to the global middle class in 1990 according to our survey-based data. In India it has gone up marginally from one to two percent. In Ghana, interestingly, the proportion has jumped from one to five percent. This has led to seventeen percent of the world's population being part of the middle class in 2010 from fourteen percent in 1990.
Sensitivity of the Global Distribution to Alternate Methodological Choices
In constructing the databases and in the subsequent analysis we make several choices.
These include: adopting a conversion factor for transforming means expressed in national currency units to a common unit which can then be used for cross-country comparisons, making decision on whether or not to standardize the distributions by estimating income from consumption (or vice versa), and using means from surveys or national accounts.
Our benchmark analysis, on which the discussion above is based, uses 2005 ICP consumption PPP's calculated based on the EKS method to convert national currencies into common international currency units; we standardize the distributions and use means from surveys (all discussed further in the paper presenting an overview of the database, previously cited). In this section, we modify some of these choices and evaluate the impact. This is in keeping with our larger goal: that the GCIP should be flexible and permit alternate choices so that we might make choices deemed more warranted for specific purposes as well as better understand the robustness of specific conclusions.
We use 2005 market exchange rates and 2011 ICP consumption PPP's as alternate currency conversion factors in the analysis below. (An alternate way to employ market exchange rates would have been to use ones which shift from year to year along with consumer price indices of a single base country for the temporal translation, but this is not an approach we presently employ). We also construct an income database (Mixed Surveys with Income Preference or MSIP) in which we do not attempt to estimate income distributions from consumption surveys but rather pool the distributional information without prior adjustment of either the distributions or the means. There is income preference only in the sense that if we have both income and consumption surveys to chose from for a country-year we prefer income surveys, which is a preference that could as well have been reversed. We again exclude China from some of the analysis to evaluate the country's impact on the world. Figure 20 depicts the density function corresponding to the resulting alternate databases.
The income database (GID) has a wider support than the consumption distribution (GCD)
for the 2005 PPP base year, it seems because there are many poorer people in the world whose reported or estimated consumption appears to be significantly higher than their income. Whether this comparison arising from a 'snapshot' of the two distributions reflects a temporary phenomenon or one that is more durable, as well as its sources, might explored further. As we discuss further below, there is evidence that the gap has increased markedly since 1990. 6 Interestingly, the density of the income distribution arrived at without any standardization (i.e. by assuming that an income distribution is in relative terms exactly the same as a consumption distribution, when only information about the latter is available, but combining this with an estimate of the income mean) is almost identical to the consumption distribution. This may be because many populous regions in the world tend to have consumption surveys, in particular in South Asia and Africa and often in East Asia too, and thus provide much of the mass of the density functions in both cases. As expected, the exchange rate distribution is the most unequal;
in particular it starts at lower income level than other distributions and runs to a slightly higher income level. This is expected as market exchange rates overstate what is needed to achieve a similar cost of living in poorer countries, thus underestimating the real purchasing power of incomes of households in these countries, with the extent of the discrepancy being inversely related to income of the country (the Balassa-Samuleson effect). Although we show the income distribution for the 2011 PPP base year on the same graph, it must be kept in mind that these are in different units ( The level of inequality as judged by different inequality measures varies across the alternate datasets (Table 5 ). The market exchange rate dataset unsurprisingly exhibits the highest level of inequality followed by the unstandardized dataset. Part of the increase in global inequality in the unstandardized dataset is a result of the increase in betweencountry inequality that comes from using it, as it leads to the use of lower mean estimates for poorer countries with consumption distributions (Table 6 ). The inequality between means from income surveys, predominantly done in the developed and upper middleincome countries, and means from consumption surveys in poorer countries is greater than in standardized means in the benchmark database. Although global inequality has declined between 1990 and 2010, within-country inequality increased on average in the same period (Table 5 ). The population-weighted average Gini coefficient of countries increased in all three datasets. The weightedaverage consumption Gini coefficient is 0.11 lower than the weighted-average income Gini coefficient. Making cross-country comparisons of inequality in the non-standardized dataset might lead to incorrect conclusions since the observed levels of inequality in a country with a consumption survey will tend to be lower than those for a country with an income survey. Indeed, as we showed previously considerable re-ranking can occur when one uses a consistent income Gini coefficient (obtained after standardization). We The cumulative growth record across the percentiles in the global distribution depends on the dataset used to evaluate it (Figure 21 ). For each dataset considered (varying for example according to whether it is based on standardized surveys of a specific type, mixed surveys, or exchange rate concepts) there was a peak in growth rates between the fiftieth and sixtieth percentile, but the levels of cumulative growth vary tremendously by percentile. It can be seen that the most consequential choice is that between income and consumption based estimates, with income-based estimates, regardless of the exchangerate concept, showing a bell-shaped growth incidence curve with much higher cumulative growth rates for the middle-sections of the world population. The high growth-rates of the middle sections of the population are, however, crucially dependent on the role of China, as can be seen by comparison with the growth incidence curve for income that strips it out. It is also noteworthy that there is slight non-monotonicity as one moves to the right, with the very highest percentiles in the world having somewhat higher cumulative growth rates than those immediately below them. These results could of course be further substantially influenced by the inclusion of top income information from non-survey sources --an extension to the database we are working on. The growth-rates for consumption for the poorer sections of the world population also seem to have been generally considerably greater for consumption than for income over the timeperiod, suggesting that the magnitude of the excess of consumption over income observed of the relatively poor in recent years may have increased fairly recently.
Conclusion:
We have in this paper provided a broad overview of the changes in the world distribution of income and consumption over the last five decades. Using a more comprehensive and internally consistent database than previously available, we reproduce some patterns that have emerged in other recent research and drew some new conclusions about the differing patterns in regional distributions and the sources of changes in global inequality and poverty as well the overall record of world development. The enormous importance of China for our conclusions in all of these areas of concern stands out. We have shown that while absolute poverty has declined by most measures, by comparison to a higher and plausible poverty line, poverty across the world has not changed significantly over three or even five decades. Collective global economic 'welfare' as assessed according to standard assumptions appears to have increased, but the major increase took place in the early 2000s, and may or may not be durable.
We gave some support to previous findings (for example the disappearance of the global 'twin peaks' and the appearance of a degree of 'inequality convergence') and identified new stylized facts (for example the fact that the Sub-Saharan African countries' inequality, when measured in a way so as to standardize these surveys with those from other countries, is among the very highest in the world, and in particular higher than in Latin America). Moreover, we show that much of our picture of what has happened to the world depends on choices with respect to the variable depicting individual advantage, the choice with respect to exchange rate (e.g. PPP of a given base year vs. market exchange rate). Each of these may be justified depending upon the purpose at hand, but has significant implications for our understanding of how the world's population, as a whole and in its parts, has been faring. We seek to enable multiple methods to be chosen from while understanding more fully what is implied by the choice among them. In the process, we hope to develop better knowledge of who got what, then and now. 
